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A LAW FIRM PENSION PLAN?
By LESTER R. RUSOFF*
Two areas of tax law meet here. One relates to pension plans
and the other relates to the treatment of unincorporated organiza-
tions as corporations for tax purposes.
Substantial tax advantages can be obtained if an employer es-
tablishes a pension plan, meeting certain requirements, for the bene-
fit of his employees. An employer may deduct his contributions to
the plan.' Income earned by principal accummulated under the plan
s exempt from income taxation. 2 Contributions made by the em-
ployer are not taxed to the employees when the contributions are
made but only when benefits are distributed or made available to
them,3 and if the interest of an employee is distributed within one
taxable year on account of his death or separation from the employ-
er's service, his gain is taxed only as long-term capital gain.4 Be-
cause of these tax advantages, a qualified pension plan is especially
beneficial to persons in high tax brackets. Their contributions to
such a plan may give them much greater after-tax benefits than
they would receive from comparable increases in salary.
The Internal Revenue Code extends these privileges, however,
only to a plan "of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his em-
ployees or their beneficiaries. "5 Thus a plan does not qualify if the
employer is included as a participant.6 This does not create diffi-
culties in the case of a corporate employer, because shareholder-
employees may participate in a plan without necessarily preventing
it from qualifying. 7 However, it prevents an individual proprietor
or a member of a partnership from participating in a qualified plan.
This situation has led to efforts in two directions. First, legisla-
tion has been proposed to allow the self-employed to deduct sums
which they set aside for their own retirement. H. R. 10, to this ef-
fect, is now under consideration. Second, some unincorporated
groups have sought to use the concept of an "association" to gain
the income tax treatment of a corporation and thus to establish
qualified pension plans.
The Commissioner has long used the concept of an "association"
to extract additional taxes. This concept appears in the definition
of a corporation, which is stated to include associations, joint-stock
companies, and insurance companies.8 Thus, the Commissioner has
been able to impose the corporate income tax on the group and then
to tax its members on amounts distributed to them, as dividends.
This approach has not been much of a threat to partnerships of doc-
tors or lawyers, probably because such partnerships have rarely
desired to imitate the basic characteristics of a corporation and be-
cause such partnerships, if treated as associations, could usually de-
*Mr. Rusoff is Professor of Low at the University of Montana School of Low.
1 tnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404.
2 tnt. Rev. Code of 1954, 501(a).
I nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 402(a).
4 int. Rev. Code of 1954, 402(a)(2).
5 tnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a).
6 I.T. 3268, 1939-1 Cum. Bull. (Port 1) 196.
7 Treas. Reg. J 1.401-1(b)(3) (1956), as amended, T. D. 6301, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 197.
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a)(3).
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duct substantially all of the earnings of the group as salaries paid to
members, so that no substantial corporate tax would be incurred.
Because of present interest of doctors and lawyers in setting up
qualified pension plans, however, we must inquire into the law
which developed when the concept of an association was used pki-
marily to collect more taxes from unincorporated groups. The lead-
ing case was Morrissey v. Commissioner.9 In that case, real estate
was transferred to trustees. They were authorized to choose their
successors, to buy, sell, and operate land, to construct and operate
golf courses and club houses, to receive the income, to make invest-
ments, and generally to manage the property as if they were the
owners. The trustees had no power to create liability personal to
the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were to get transferable certifi-
cates of interest. Neither the death of a trustee nor that of a bene-
ficiary was to terminate the trust. The Supreme Court held that the
group was an association and could be taxed as a corporation. It
said, "The inclusion of associations with corporations implies resem-
blance; but it is resemblance and not identity."'10 The Court indicat-
ed that the result was influenced by: the existence of associates in
an enterprise for doing business and provisions making for continui-
ty of existence, centralization of management, transferability of
beneficial interests, and limited liability.
Which factors were most significant? It has been thought that
they were centralization of management and continuity of life.11
This seems to have been the position of the Treasury Department
under the 1939 Code.1'
2
The next question is this: does local law govern in deciding
whether the essential characteristic of an association exists? The
regulations under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code gave the impres-
sion that it did not. They included this statement:
For the purpose of taxation the Internal Revenue Code
makes its own classification and prescribes its own stand-
ards of classification. Local law is of no importance in this
connection. Thus .... I] he term "corporation" is not limit-
ed to the artificial entity usually known as a corporation,
but includes also ... certain kinds of partnerships.
1 3
The Supreme Court used language pointing the same way:
Neither the conception of unincorporated associations pre-
vailing under the local law, nor the relation under that law
of the association to its shareholders, nor their relation to
each other and to outsiders, is of legal significance as bear-
ing upon the power of Congress to determine how and at
what rate the income of the joint enterprise shall be taxed.
14
The regulations might have been interpreted to mean only that
federal law determined the standards of classification of an associa-
tion and that local law determined whether those standards are met
in a given case; but the language of the Supreme Court seems to
give local law no effect.
Only one case, apparently, held that a group of professional men
9 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
10 Id. at 357.
11 Driscoll, The Limited Partnership and the Association Question, 1960 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 539, 553.
12 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-2, 39.3797-4(a) (1953).
13 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-1 (1953).
14 Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925).
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was taxable as an association, before such classification became a
benefit rather than a burden. That case was Pelton v. Commission-
er.'" There, several doctors transferred their equipment to them-
selves as trustees, with authority to operate a clinic or any allied
business. They agreed that the trustees should not be personally
liable for acts done in performing their duties. This attempt to limit
liability apparently did not apply to the individual doctors as doc-
tors. There was a provision for filling vacancies among the trustees.
The beneficial interests were held by the transferors and were to be
transferable by them, subject to an option in the other beneficiaries
to buy before there should be any transfers to outsiders. During
the taxable years in question, the transferors were the only bene-
ficiaries. Thus, this organization had provisions for continuity of
life and modified transferability of interests but did not really have
centralization of management or limited liability. The Court, how-
ever, thought that the four characteristics of continuity, centraliza-
tion, limited liability, and transferability were sufficiently present
so that the organization should be treated as an association, subject
to the corporate income tax.
The question of whether a professional partnership can be
treated as an association became acute when pension plans became
popular. Then it was seen that the concept of an association might
be turned against the Commissioner. In United States v. Kintner,'"
a partnership of doctors dissolved and reorganized as an unincor-
porated association. Eight doctors became members. They dele-
gated management to an executive committee of five. It was pro-
vided that the interests of members should be non-assignable and
that the death or retirement of a member would not dissolve the
association. There seems to have been no attempt to protect the
members of the group from personal liability.
The court held that the clinic was an association for tax pur-
poses and that its pension plan, which included primarily the doc-
tors who were the members of the association, was a qualified plan.
The court said:
It should be added that it would introduce an anarchic ele-
ment in the federal taxation if we determined the nature
of associations by State criteria rather than by special
criteria sanctioned by the tax law, the regulations and the
15 82 F. 2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
16 216 F. 2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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courts. It would destroy the uniformity so essential to a
federal tax system,-a uniformity which calls for equal
treatment of taxpayers, no matter in what State their ac-
tivities are carried on. For it would mean that tax incid-
ences as to taxpayers in the same category would be de-
termined differently according to the law of the State of
residence."
Recently, a similar decision was made by a federal district court
in Texas. 8 In that case, a group of seven doctors formed an associa-
tion to replace a partnership. Their motive, as found by the court,
was to solve problems relating to a need for centralized manage-
ment, limitation of liability of the individual doctors, continuity of
life, and a better method of holding title to the property. They
agreed to elect a board of directors of six, which was to appoint an
executive committee of two to handle details, subject to control by
the board of directors. Interests of the members were to be trans-
ferable, subject to an option in the group and the other members
to buy at the offering price. It was provided that the members
should not be liable for debts of the group or of any member until
the assets of the group and of the defaulting member should be ex-
hausted. Assets of the group were not to be distributed until the
termination of the association, which was to last for 35 years. The
agreement of the parties, then, purported to provide for centraliza-
tion of management, continuity of life, and modified transferability
of interests. It did not establish limited liability like that of cor-
porate stockholders. The government took the position that the tax-
payer, a member of the association, was taxable on his proportionate
interests in a reserve fund set aside by the association and returned
by it as corporate income. The court held for the taxpayer.
The government has not acquiesced in the Kintner or Galt
decisions.1 9 For a time, it held that if a partnership adopted the
corporate form to get the benefits of a qualified pension plan, it was
a partnership for all purposes. 20 Later it ruled that the mere fact
that a group attempted to set up a qualified pension plan would not
determine whether it was a partnership or an association.
2' 1
Now, proposed regulations have been issued. 22 Our present
question, then, is: are those regulations consistent with the decided
cases, and will it be practicable, under them, for a professional part-
nership to adopt such a form as to be able to establish a qualified
pension plan? It seems generally to be assumed that, if a profes-
sional partnership can so reorganize as to be an "association," its
members will be treated as "employees" under the provisions relat-
ing to pension plans, but at least one source has urged caution as to
this.
23
A striking feature of the proposed regulations is the following
language:
Although it is the Internal Revenue Code rather than local
17 216 F. 2d 418, 424 (9th Cir. 1954).
18 Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp 360, 1959-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 73,513 (N.D. Tex. 1959). (The facts
in this case are reported in U.S. Tax Cas. but not in F. Supp.).
19 The government appealed the Gait decision, but the appeal was dismissed on November 24,
1959. No further details as to the dismissal appear to be available.
20 Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 Cum. bull. 598.
21 Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 886.
22 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 24 Fed. Reg. 10450 (1959).
23 Tax Approaches, Charles D. Spencer & Associates, Inc., February, 1960.
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law which established the tests or standards which will be
applied in determining the classification in which an or-
ganization belongs, local law governs in determining wheth-
er the legal relationships which have been established in
the formation of an organization are such that the standards
are met. Thus, it is local law which must be applied in de-
termining such matters as the legal relationships of the
members of the organization among themselves and with
the public at large, and the interests of the members of the
organization in its assets.
24
Although one might rationalize the language of the old regula-
tions, which are quoted above, so as to render it consistent with that
of these proposed regulations, the mood and emphasis of the Treas-
ury Department seem definitely to have changed. It seems impos-
sible to reconcile the language of the proposed regulations with that
of the Supreme Court in Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, also
quoted above, or with the fact that in the other cases the courts have
looked only to the agreements made by the parties, without refer-
ence to the local law.
2 5
To weigh the effect of the proposed regulations, however, we
need to learn what standards they set up for determining whether
an organization is an association. They state six standards:
i. Associates,
ii. An objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom,
iii. Continuity of life,
iv. Centralization of management,
v. Liability for corporate debts limited to corporate prop-
erty,
vi. Free transferability of interests.
2 6
The first two standards are common to partnerships and cor-
porations, so that our problem centers around the meaning of the
remaining four standards and the possibility of meeting them.
When does the organization have "continuity of life"? "An or-
ganization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy,
retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause
a dissolution of the organization." 2 7 The regulations state that, al-
24 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451 (1959).
25 Bittker, The Corporation Income Tax 30 (1959).
26 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451 (1959).
27 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451 (1959).
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though the parties may agree that none of these events shall dis-
solve the organization, there is not continuity of life if under local
law the organization may be dissolved by the occurrence of one of
these events or by an act of a member of the group, even though
that act is a violation of the agreement.2 1 Under Colorado law, the
expulsion of a partner, the death or bankruptcy of a partner, or an
expression of the will of any partner at any time, although in viola-
tion of the agreement of the parties, dissolves a partnership. 9 Also,
a partner or a purchaser of the interest of a partner can get a judi-
cial decree dissolving a partnership." Thus a Colorado partnership
cannot meet the standard of continuity of life set by these regula-
tions.
The next standard discussed by the proposed regulations is
centralization of management. The regulations state that this stand-
ard is met if "any person (or group of persons which does not in-
clude all members) has continuing exclusive authority to make the
management decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for
which the organization was formed. ' 3 1 The regulations also state,
however, that in the case of a general partnership an agreement
that the powers of management shall be exclusively in a selected
few is ineffective against outsiders without notice and that there-
fore a general partnership cannot meet this standard.32  Here the
regulations have stated the effect of local law, which seems odd, but
they have done it correctly.3: Thus the standard of centralization of
management cannot be met.
Another standard is limited liability. It is said to exist "if there
is no member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims
against the organization. '3 4 Under Colorado law, however, all part-




The last standard is that of transferability of interests. This re-
quires that each member be able, without the consent of the others,
to substitute an outsider for himself. He must be able to transfer
all of the attributes of his position, not only his right to share in
profits but also his right to participate in management.3" The regu-
lations recognize that members of a partnership may be unwilling
to permit transfers of interests without having a right first to buy
those interests for themselves. Thus it is stated that a modified forr-
of transferability exists if there is such an option but that this form
of transferability has less weight.1 7 Under Colorado law, a partner-
ship can make an effective agreement that a partner may assign his
interest and that the assignee will step completely into the shoes of
the transferor t 3 The difficulty here may be a practical one, that
members of a law firm, because of the personal character of the re-
lationship among the partners, may be unwilling to make such an
28 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2),(3), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451-2 (1959).
'20 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-31 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, 9 31).
to( Colo. Rev, Stat. § 104-1-32 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, 9 32).
:1 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-2(c)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
:32 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-2(c)(4), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
33 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-9 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, 9 9).
34 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(d)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
:5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-15 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, . 15).
36 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-1(c)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
37 Proposed Treas. Reg. 9 301.7701-1(e)(2), 24 Fed. Reg. 10452 (1959).
:19 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 104-1-18, 27 (1953). (Uniform Partnership Act, §§ 18, 27).
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agreement, even though they provide that any interest must be of-
fered to present partners before it is transferred to an outsider."
Must a group qualify in respect to all of the standards set by
the regulations to be treated as an association? Apparently, it need
not. The text states that "[a] n organization will be treated as an
association if the corporate characteristics are such that the organi-
zation more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership or
trust. ' '40 The regulations include examples which indicate that an
organization may be treated as an association if it has the modified
form of transferability of interests and meets two of the standards
of continuity of life, centralization of management, and limited lia-
bility. Modified transferability plus only one of the other character-
istics, such as centralized management, is treated as insufficient.
Thus, the proposed regulations look to local law to determine
whether the standards are met, and under Colorado law those stand-
ards cannot be met. This situation is not peculiar to Colorado. Our
statutes are based on the Uniform Partnership Act, which is law
in at least 38 states and Guam. The same results are likely to occur
in other states, since the act is largely in accord with the common
law.
4 1
Would it be possible to comply with the proposed regulations
by adopting a form that would not be that of a general partnership
under local law but would be that of a limited partnership or a
39 Stutsman, New Kintner Regs. not Retroactive, Give Specific Criteria to Test Partnership,
12 J. Taxation 174, 176 (1960).
40 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1), 24 Fed. Reg. 10451 (1959).
41 Crane, Partnership and Other Unincorporated Associations 7 (2nd ed. 1952).
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trust? This seems doubtful. Limited partners contribute property
to the firm rather than services, so that a limited partnership does
not appear adaptable to the practice of law.42 Is the use of the trust
form a better possibility? Under principles of trust law, a business
can be organized in such form as to 'provide continuity of life, cen-
tralization of management, limited liability, and transferability of
interests, within the meaning of the proposed regulations.
43
Here, however, we meet objections based on legal ethics. The
Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association
has already ruled that it would be improper for members of a law
firm to transfer their interests in the firm to a trust which would
employ the members of the firm and create a pension or profit-
sharing plan for their benefit.44 The committee thought that the
specific proposal before it would not create a trust, because of con-
trol over the trustees reserved to the beneficiaries. At some length,
however, the committee argued that even if a trust were created
the arrangement would violate several of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.
Canon 33 prohibits misleading use of a firm name. The com-
mittee thought that the proposed plan would violate this canon by
giving the impression that the firm was a partnership, rather than
a trust. A potential client, if he considered the problem of liability
for malpractice, might suppose that all members of the firm would
be personally liable for the act of any member. This supposition
seems to be correct in the case of a general partnership; if the firm
were a trust, however, only the trustees and the corpus, through
the right of the trustees to reimbursement, would be liable for the
acts of lawyers employed by the trust. Thus there may theoretically
be some merit in this objection by the committee. That this objec-
tion has practical importance seems doubtful.
Canon 34 forbids splitting fees with laymen. The committee
thought that this canon would be doubly violated by the proposal.
First, the fees would be paid to the trustees and would be used by
them, in part, to pay clerks and stenographers. Second, beneficial
interests in the trust, through death or otherwise, might pass to lay-
men. The first objection seems weak, since part of the fees received
by a lawyer generally do go to his clerks and stenographers. The
second might be avoided by prohibiting transfers of beneficial in-
terests to laymen and by making an agreement for the purchase of
the interest of any retiring member of the firm, either by the firm
or by its members.
Canon 35 prohibits the intervention of a lay agency between a
lawyer and his client. The committee thought this canon would be
violated by a provision that all fees be paid to the trustees. The
proposal would have required the trustees to be lawyers, so it is dif-
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-2-4 (1953). (Uniform Limited Partnership Act, § 4).
43 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b),(c) example 2, 24 Fed. Reg. 10454 (1959). It might be
noted that the limited liability available in the case af a trust relates to liability for acts of the
trustees, not to liability for the acts of beneficiaries rendering personal services. Thus, it seems improb-
able that the operation of a legal or medical firm through a trust device, even if otherwise feasible,
would protect a member of the firm from liability for his own malpractice. As a practical matter, this
seems to be the more significant liability for a doctor or a lawyer. For the purpose of classifying a
group as an "association" however, the lock of personal liability for acts of the trustees may be the
significant factor.
44 Opinion 283, 36 A.B.A.J. 870 (1950).
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ficult to see how it would violate this canon any more than the usual
operation of a large law firm.
It may be that the objections raised by the Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics are not very weighty. Its opinion must be consid-
ered, however, and we should also keep in mind that the objections
made to the use of the form of a trust seem equally applicable to an
imitation of corporate form.
Assuming that the Committee on Professional Ethics might
change its opinion or that it might approve a different plan, is there
any possibility of solving the tax difficulties in the way of estab-
lishing a qualified pension plan for a law firm? If the proposed reg-
ulations become final in their present form, the courts may hold
them invalid. Their emphasis on local law is inconsistent with the
language of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. Furthermore, that emphasis is inconsistent with the
results in the Pelton, Kintner, and Galt cases that involved groups
of professional men. The leading Kintner case, dealing with the
taxable year 1948, arose in Montana, where the Uniform Partner-
ship Act had been adopted in 1947. It would seem in some areas
of federal taxation, the courts have given considerable weight to
local law. For example, nothing is included in the gross estate of a
decedent on account of a life estate held by him but created by an-
other; state law governs as to whether the decedent in fact had a life
estate.45, It might be said, in general, that federal law determines
the tax consequences of the rights and duties of a taxpayer, but
state law is used to decide what his rights and duties are. The pro-
posed regulations fit this approach. Anyone considering the possi-
bility of contesting their validity ought to study other areas in
which this problem of state versus federal law has arisen.46 He
should also consider the problem of whether the interpretation of
the statute here has become so settled by the existence of regulations
and decisions and the passage of time that the Treasury Department
cannot change it prospectively.4 7 The Treasury may revise the pro-
posed regulations so as to make the provisions of the agreement
among the parties govern, even though they may deprive members
of a firm only of the right to take certain steps and not of the
power.48 It now seems more probable, however, that the Treasury
definitely wants to discourage professional partnerships from adopt-
ing the form of an association. An Under Secretary of the Treasury
has recently written that:
45 Helvering v. Rhodes Estate, 117 F. 2d 509 (8th Cir. 1941).
46 This subject is considered at length in 10 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation, J§
61.01-61.09 (Zimet and Stern rev. 1958).
47 1 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation, §§ 3.20-3.25 (Zimet, Stanley, and Kilcullen rev.
1956).
48 For arguments that this should be done see: Saltz, Associations, 38 Taxes 187, 191 (1960);
Stutsmnn, New Kintner Regs. not Retroactive, Give Specific Criteria to Test Partnership, 12 J. Taxation






The Internal Revenue Service has administrative problems
in dealing with partnerships which attempt to be treated
as associations in order to allow the members to obtain cov-
erage under qualified pension plans. This constantly raises
difficult questions of substance over form.
49
Congress has had under consideration for some time a bill
which would permit self-employed individuals to make deductible
contributions to retirement plans for their own benefit. If such a
bill becomes law, the interest of professional partnerships in the
use of the form of an association may die, except where there are
practical, non-tax advantages in that form. Fringe benefits other
than pensions may be provided through the form of an association,
but it is not known whether they alone would create substantial in-
terest in the use of that form.
The Treasury has, however, opposed that bill, and now has made
a counter-proposal. The gist of this proposal is that the provisions
relating to pension and profit-sharing plans for employees be re-
vised so that an individual proprietor or a partner may treat him-
self as an employee and participate in such a plan. There are sev-
eral limitations in the proposal: 1. Participation would have to be
open, on a non-discriminatory basis, to employees who are not own-
ers of the business. 2. The owner could participate only if he per-
formed personal services. 3. Contributions for the benefit of the
owner would be limited, at least if none of his employees received
substantial vested interests, and 4. the Treasury would like to abol-
ish the present capital-gains treatment of distributions made in one
year on termination of service. This change would apply to all pen-
sion and profit-sharing plans, regardless of whether the owner of
the business is a participant. For this privilege, the Treasury pro-
poses to substitute some type of averaging of income.
The limitations in the Treasury's proposal do not seem severe.
At present corporations appear able to establish pension plans pri-
marily for the benefit of the shareholder-employees, because they
are permitted to exclude many other employees, such as those paid
wages and those who have been employed for less than five years.
Most law firms have few employees, especially with service of five
years or more, and the inclusion of long-term employees would
probably not be an unjustified hardship on a firm.
We do not, of course, know whether Congress will adopt the
proposal of the Treasury Department. When it adopted provisions
permitting unincorporated businesses to elect to be taxed as corpora-
tions, it specifically provided that a partner or proprietor of such a
business shall not be considered an employee for purposes of the
sections relating to employees' pension trusts.0 The fact that this
present proposal comes from the Treasury Department may make a
substantial difference.
If this proposal is adopted, it seems to answer our problem.
Lawyers will be able to participate in pension plans with substan-
tial tax advantages, and they will not have to change their mode of
operations or risk professional disapproval to do it.
49 Letter of Under Secretary Fred C. Scribner, Jr. to Senator Harry F. Byrd, Chairman, Committee
on Finance, April 1, 1960.
50 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1361(d).
